A Tale of Two Forms of Protest

In 2005, the Victorian Government established the Human Rights Consultation Committee to undertake a community consultation about the state of rights in Victoria. The main recommendation of the Committee was the enactment of a domestic rights instrument for Victoria. The Victorian Government accepted the recommendation and, by mid-2006, the Victorian Parliament had enacted the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). The Charter is based largely on the British Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) ('HRA'). This article explores some of the substantive difficulties with the adoption of the British model given the twin stated aims of the Victorian Government to preserve parliamentary sovereignty and to establish an educative inter-institutional dialogue. In particular, it explores how the mechanisms adopted to preserve parliamentary sovereignty - the s 32 judicial power of rights-compatible interpretation and the s 36 judicial power of declaration - may, in fact, undermine parliamentary sovereignty, threaten the educative dialogue amongst the differently placed, skilled and motivated arms of government, erode the justificatory and accountability aspects of rights instruments, and undermine the protection of rights.

Despite aims to create a progressive inter-institutional dialogue about human rights, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) (Charter) has largely fallen flat. This becomes clearest when examining the failure of governments, regulators and services to comply with and properly consider rights when providing public mental health services. By failing to embed human rights in relevant policy levers, institutional and service design processes and workforce initiatives, the Charter bears little relevance to the day-to-day operation of the clinical mental health system. This paper argues that existing obligations on public authorities require a more systematic integration of human rights into the mental health system. In particular, it highlights the importance of Charter implementation into systems monitoring, service commissioning, regulatory oversight, service models of care, clinical governance frameworks and workforce development.

Despite being the second Australian jurisdiction to introduce legislative human rights protections in 2006 (Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)), Victoria has failed to bring the legislation governing juvenile detention (the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic)) in line with the human rights protections contained in the Charter. This was brought to the fore with the Victorian Government’s decision to detain children in a precinct in the Barwon adult maximum security prison in late 2016— a decision that the Supreme Court twice ruled breached the rights of the children protected by the Charter (Certain Children decisions 2016 and 2017). This article focuses on the solitary confinement of children and young people (aged 18 to 24 years) as a specific area in which Victorian legislation fails to comply with the Charter and international human rights law, as well as the main practice that has ultimately led to the first court decision concerning the rights of those in closed environments where the Charter has provided an immediate remedy.

The Promise and Practice of Protecting Human Rights: Reflections on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms

The emerging field of public health ethics

Mitigating the impacts of racism on Indigenous wellbeing through human rights, legislative and health policy reform.

For centuries, the protection of fundamental human rights has been part of the historical conceptual and constitutional legacy of the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic. Great thinkers from all nations have contributed towards the generation of human and fundamental rights. Nowadays these rights (or at least their substance) are universally recognised, beyond the continents of Europe and America. Virtually all the UN nations recognise them at least verbally. The fact that they are not put into effect, let alone observed, everywhere, does not alter their claim to validity. Practice and theory operate at different speeds, and politics carries the duty to change this.^ The academic world is only able to send out reminders and to encourage progress. The General Assembly of the UN adopted a "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" on 10 December 1948. Following on from the origin of their spiritual forefathers, it was rooted in the European and American declarations of human rights, and embodied human dignity, protection of personality, individual rights to freedom, equality under the law, basic judicial rights and rights to political codetermination. However, these traditional rights were extended to include more recent legal rights, which had become manifestly threatened through experiences in the Thirties and Forties, namely bans on torture and deportation, the right of asylum and the right to citizenship. Certain social, economic and cultural rights were also added. However, it must be noted that the Declaration has not acquired the status of a binding international legal rule, despite the fact that a minimum standard (irrespective of how this may be circumscribed), has by now become a constituent of customary international law. Further markers en route to an international Charter of Human Rights have included numerous special declarations and conventions, and in particular the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic and Social and

The meaning, scope and interaction of the key provisions relating to the rights-compatibility of legislation under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) were analysed by the Victorian Court of Appeal inRv Momcilovic. On appeal, the High Court of Australia reviewed this analysis and considered the constitutionality of the key provisions. Although overall the High Court upheld the provisions as constitutional, no majority opinion emerged on the scope and operation of the provisions in Victoria, with similar differences of opinion refl ected in the Victorian superior courts. Opinions differed on: the role, if any, of limitations under s 7(2); whether s 32(1) is an ordinary rule of statutory construction or a ‘remedial’ rule of interpretation; and the constitutionality and role of s 36(2) declarations of inconsistent interpretation. Even where a degree of agreement was apparent on one provision, the reasoning underlying the agreement differed, and/or there was no agreement on the interlinking provisions. An overarching theme concerned the methodology by which to approach the key provisions, which again produced disagreement. This article will critically analyse the multiplicity of views in the High Court, both because of the importance of the decision and because its application in Victoria is unclear. Regarding the latter, the Victorian superior courts have considered the Court of Appeal decision to not be overruled by the High Court, and continue to rely on it in varying degrees, whilst also seeking to identify a ratio from the High Court. By way of background, the article will explore the choices facing the Court of Appeal and its decision. It will then analyse the fi ve High Court judgments, focussing on the thematic issues of limitations, ordinary/ remedial interpretation, declarations, and methodology. It concludes with a review of the Victorian superior courts’ reaction to the High Court decision. Analysis will be limited to consideration of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) as it operates in Victoria. In addition to the specifi c disagreements on the key provisions, broaderissues of parliamentary sovereignty, the proper role of the judiciary and democratic governance will be examined.

<p>The culprit is one of the fixed parties in penal judgments and because he is to be stood before the social rights with the support of the prosecutor he enjoys a vulnerable judicial standpoint. The person being charged with a crime or an offence faces the judicial system in the preliminary investigation stage, in other words, pretrial stage. In this stage the culprit, due to the fact that has not been convicted to any crime, he has to undergo interrogation and investigation based on the acquittal principle and preservation of the human prestige and credit. Interrogating the culprit is the main axiom of the pretrial period and it is possible that the culprits be exposed to torture and inhumane behaviors as a result of their rights being ignored and their human dignity being refused by the interrogating bodies. Therefore, the accused person should be enjoying the rights and liberties under the shade of the fair judgment. On the other hand, fair judgment is not intended solely for safeguarding the accused person’s defense rights, rather a just proceeding in its exact meaning is seeking to serve the preservation and supporting the rights and the liberties of all of the individuals who somehow share the legal procedure process. Observing a fair procedure should not be taken as to mean leniency for any single one person, rather observing such principles in the proceedings causes the humanity aspect of the parties not to be underestimated and justice and fairness can be implemented and served regarding their rights.</p>In the present article because it is carried out in humanities realm we have tried to make use of an analytical-descriptive method through the use of the international charter of human rights and requirements and the constitutional laws in Iran and this is while the accused individual rights in the pretrial period has also been enumerated and elucidated on and then we deal with the survey of the Iran’s judicial system and the international charter of human rights regarding the methods of keeping a hold onto such rules and regulations and consequently we will figure that in both of the described systems it has been frequently emphasized on observing the accused person’s rights in the majority of the cases in this period and there has been criminal enforcement mandates for it.

The writer advocates the view that courts interpret statutes so as to achieve their aim; that being justice in the case: as between the parties and in respect of the law. This is identified as the common thread that explains the apparent erratic behaviour of the courts in their use of the various methods or rules of interpretation. The Supreme Court decision, Attorney General of Québec v. 2747-3174 Québec Inc., is analysed against the background of this theory and is seen to give support to it. The court is shown to use various rules of interpretation, which lead the majority to a wide, and the minority to a narrow, interpretation of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec. Yet it is clear that in both cases the rules are merely a means to an end: justice as between the parties and in respect of the law. In context of the case, this means establishing a balance between the competing interests of the State and the citizen that conforms to the law relating to fundamental rights and in particular, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec. As far as the State is concerned, it has a vested interest in confirming the constitutionality of its many administrative tribunals, which play an essential role in enabling the State to discharge its responsibility to govern. Citizens, on the other hand, need to be protected from the violation of their rights, in particular the right to an independent and impartial tribunal in matters relating to the determination of their rights and obligations, or charges brought against them. The Charter must be interpreted so that, in its scope and content, it gives real protection, but, consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, the interpretation must not amount to a usurpation by the courts of the role of the government to govern. The writer concludes that the opposing conclusions of the majority and minority are more a consequence of the difference in the opinion of the judges as to the manner in which the balance should be struck, as opposed to the rules of interpretation used by them.

The beginning of the new millennium is the period of the formation of a single information space, the formation of a global information society, the main factor in the development of which is the use of information. The processes of global informatization have a dual nature: on the one hand, they contribute to the security of the individual, society and the state, and on the other hand, information technologies pose certain threats to it. The article analyzes the possibilities of using artificial intelligence (AI) as a type of information technology (IT). Emphasis is placed on the positive and negative aspects of its impact on human rights. It was found that certain threats to humans arise when using the latest AI technologies. As a result of the analysis of international documents, it was established that the governments of many countries around the world are currently trying to protect users of digital services from its harmful effects, developing their strategies for the development and regulation of AI for this purpose. The emergence of the latest technologies has given rise to a number of new problems in the field of human rights. This is evidenced by a number of international documents on «digital human rights». So, for example, the «Portuguese Charter of Human Rights in the Digital Age», «Lisbon Declaration», «European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles of the Digital Decade» in their provisions, on the one hand, emphasize the rights to use AI technologies, and on the other – on the safety of these technologies for humans. This caused heated discussions among scientists in the context of human information rights: whether AI as a type of information technology can be a safe means for realizing the human right to use it, and whether it can claim the status of a kind of «subject of law» in the future, which is a threat to human rights. The understanding of these problems caused by the development of AI has already become a joint task not only of scientists in the field of law, but also of scientists in the social sciences and humanities, as well as developers of computer programs.

The Organization of African States (OAU) was conceived and born in 1963 in a context of nearly untrammeled state sovereignty, in which heads of states sought sedulously to safeguard the independence so recently won. Only passing mention was made in the OAU Charter of human rights. Eighteen years later, however, following a period of widely decried abuses of basic liberties in several member states, the OAU's policy-making body adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Banjul Charter).' In late 1987 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, created by the Banjul Charter, started to function. As the body nears its fifth anniversary, a preliminary report and assessment are in order. The armatures of human rights protections provided domestically by most African states, and regionally by the Banjul Charter, are far weaker than in Western European states, and significantly weaker than in most Western Hemisphere countries, that have ratified their respective regional conventions. That Africa has a Commission at all, therefore, may be somewhat surprising; that it confronts severe limitations on its effectiveness less so. Considering the special conditions of Africa-the lengthy, searing acquaintance with colonialism; the weakly established, often insecure organs of state government and restricted government capabilities; the perilous economic situation, particularly in the late 1980s; the heavy burdens that the poorly funded OAU Secretariat carries-the Commission has had to start its activities with several strikes against it. Furthermore, the abilities of the

In many countries legal aid is an indispensable tool in order to ensure that everybody has access to the judicial system. In Europe, despite the pride of place that is rightly given to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights guarantees are found also within EU law. EU human rights have long been known to be relevant in the context of fair trial guarantees in general, for example, as they pertain to European Criminal law. But while legal aid makes sense from the perspective of the state and is important for many persons who are involved in legal disputes, the question needs to be asked whether, and if so, how the European Charter of Human Rights contributes to strengthening the right to legal aid?In this article the authors attempt to answer this question by looking at the topic from the perspective of both practicing attorneys and academicians. Based on our practical experience, we begin with the need of poor clients for legal aid, as well as the regulation of legal aid in different states. Afterwards, we will look at the right to a fair trial as it pertains to legal aid, paying attention to legal aid in different cases before answering the question of the EU Charter’s impact on legal aid.

"International Charter of human rights" is generic name under which shall meet themain international instruments relating to human rights, namely: Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, the International Pact on civil and political rights, the International Pact oneconomic, social and cultural rights and the two optional Protocols at International Pact oncivil and political rights. Documents forming "The Charter of International human rights"have represented international instruments which have been triggered an active process inthe evolution of legal instruments and mechanisms consecrating and protection of the humanbeing in universal and regional plan.In this way at the international relations the man is now a supreme value to beprotected and promoted.

'Certainty and coherence in the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)'