Abstract
Car-hailing safety supervision is of great significance to ease the pressure on urban public transportation and facilitate people to travel safely and conveniently. In this article, a novel tripartite evolutionary game theory is proposed to describe the interaction mechanism of the government supervision department, online vehicle platform security monitoring department, and car sharing owner in the process of China’s Internet ride-hailing operation. The replication dynamics equations are used to elaborate the evolutionary stable strategies of stakeholders and system dynamics are presented to explore the dynamic simulation process of the evolutionary game model, analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and determines an equilibrium solution. The meaningful simulation results are as follows: there is no stable strategy for the evolution of the three-party selection strategy; the optimized dynamic penalty incentive control scenario can not only effectively suppress fluctuations, but also achieve the effect of obtaining an ideal evolutionary stable strategy. It shows that the cost of government supervision, the platform monitoring and the online hailed car owner can influence the strategy choice of the stakeholders; the government should impose appropriate fines and penalty on the platform and reward car owners, which will help all parties to the game reach a stable state; appropriate punishment-reward factors help the system to reach steady state more easily. These results can provide a theoretical guidance for the government to promote the development of online car-hailing service and establishment of the supervision and management system.
Highlights
As a product of the sharing economy and the Internet plus era, the online car-hailing service platforms have realized the effective utilization of idle resources by using Internet technology [1], have greatly satisfied people’s demands for convenient travel [2], and have attracted many consumers with its convenient and high-quality service [3]
In the case of uncertain information, the evolutionary equilibrium stability analysis is performed to the dynamic game among online car-hailing service safety supervision and management departments of government, safety monitoring departments of online car-hailing service platforms and online hailed car owners, which reveals the dynamic characteristics of the three parties of the game
IMPLICATIONS Aiming at the dynamic complexity of the multi-participant and multi-player game of the safety supervision of the online car-hailing service, a evolutionary game model of the safety supervision of the online car-hailing service based on SD is established by combining the idea of the dynamic evolutionary game with the computer simulation method based on system dynamics
Summary
As a product of the sharing economy and the Internet plus era, the online car-hailing service platforms have realized the effective utilization of idle resources by using Internet technology [1], have greatly satisfied people’s demands for convenient travel [2], and have attracted many consumers with its convenient and high-quality service [3]. The reality shows that current online carhailing service safety supervision and management system still faces many problems and the market regulation alone cannot make a healthy development of the online car-hailing industry. The purpose of this study is to address the problem of the multi-party complex dynamic game in the safety operation supervision and management of online car-hailing service. In the case of uncertain information, the evolutionary equilibrium stability analysis is performed to the dynamic game among online car-hailing service safety supervision and management departments of government, safety monitoring departments of online car-hailing service platforms and online hailed car owners, which reveals the dynamic characteristics of the three parties of the game.
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