Abstract

"Secondary presumption" is a not uncommon judicial phenomenon in civil trial practice. Prohibiting secondary presumption on the grounds of "increasing the uncertainty of the conclusion" would unreasonably restrict the free evaluation of evidence. The root cause of this issue lies in the failure to recognize that factual presumptions constitute the fundamental units of indirect proof, concurrently neglecting the repercussions of positing rationales on the categorical nature of legal presumptions.. From a typological perspective, secondary presumptions can be classified into four types: "factual presumption + factual presumption," "factual presumption + legal presumption," "legal presumption + factual presumption," and "legal presumption + legal presumption." The legitimacy of secondary presumptions in different types needs to be discussed based on the nature of internal elements. The conclusion of secondary presumptions is essentially an evidentiary fact, no different from other evidentiary facts. Judges should judge its probability, striving not to undermine the subjective status of the free evaluation of evidence.

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