A study on the development and implications of low-yield nuclear weapons, focusing on deterrence theory

Sungjoon Moon

doi:10.37944/jams.v4i3.132

Abstract

This study aims to examine the development status and technical characteristics of low-yield nuclear weapons initiated by the Trump administration, predict the development trend in the Biden administration, analyze strategic implications that have affected the R.O.K.-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and seek future countermeasures. Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation. Additionally, low-yield nuclear weapons can be evaluated as having the capability, communication of nuclear retaliation wills and possibilities, and credibility for these wills and capabilities, which are 3C elements of deterrence in that they are “possible-use nuclear weapons.” Hence, they can be evaluated as highly-applicable deterrence means. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the U.S. is developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, this article intends to make several suggestions regarding deterrence and response. First, because North Korea's policy to strengthen its tactical nuclear capabilities in 2021 is inevitably closely related to the technical characteristics of the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, it should be evaluated and prepared in connection with this. Second, it is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022. Third, to ensure the credibility of the R.O.K.-U.S. tailored deterrence strategy, “multilateral deterrence measures” must be considered at the regional level, including low-yield nuclear weapons.

Highlights

Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation
It is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022
Deterrence operation)’을 수행한 바 있어 저위력 핵무기를 기존의 전술핵무기로 구분할 수도 없는 실정이다. 저위력 중력폭탄 B61-12도 장거리 전략폭격기(B-1B, B-2A, B-52, B-21)뿐만 아니라 F-15, F-16, F-35 전투기에도 탑재하여 작전 목적에 따라 다양하게 운용될 수 있으며 최근 극초음 속 미사일 개발에 W76-2 저위력 핵탄두를 탑재하는 방안도 고려되고 있는 것으로 알려져 있다 (Cummings, 2020)

Summary

Operational reach Global

13) Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (CRS Report for Congress). https://www.legistorm.com/reports/view/crs/330685/Nonstrategic_ Nuclear_Weapons.html. 13) Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (CRS Report for Congress). 북한의 전술핵 개발 가능성과 핵전략 및 핵 지휘통제 측면에서의 함의. 2018 년 미국 트럼프 행정부는 이를 가리켜 ‘미국의 역내 억제 전력에 악의적으로 이용 가능한 빈틈 (exploitable gap)이 있음을 지적하면서 NPR을 통해 저위력(low-yield)의 SLBM, 중력폭탄, 잠수함 발사순항미사일(SLCM: Submarine Launched Cruise Missile)의 개발을 선언하였다. 트럼프 행정 부는 핵탄두와 기존 무기체계의 유연한 조합을 통한 다양한 핵능력을 확보하여 맞춤형억제 (tailored deterrence)를 제고시키고자 의도하였다. 2019년 발간된 미 합참의 합동핵작전에 “핵전력 에 필요한 능력(necessary capabilities)으로 다양성, 적응성, 효과성, 대응성, 그리고 생존성이 반드 시 필요하다”고 기술하고 있다(US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).15) 2021년 11월 현재, 미국이 추진하 고 있는 신형 3종 저위력 핵무기 개발현황은 아래 Table 2와 같다. Status of the development of a new low-yield nuclear weapons in the U.S

Tomahawk SLCM

Classification Nuclear warhead