Abstract
This paper studied a motivation mechanism for attaining the target of energy conservation and emission reduction program in Xinjiang Province, China. It is known that the final goal of enterprises and governments is to realize profit maximization, based on which this paper set up a complete and imperfect information dynamic game model with enterprises and governments as two parties involved. Through the analysis of the model, it was found that reducing governments’ inspection cost cannot urge enterprises to conduct the conservation and emission reduction program and intensifying punishment for illegality behaviors which are against the energy conservation and emission reduction program will promote the development of enterprises’ energy conservation and emission reduction program. Keywords-energy conservation and emission reduction; motivation mechanism; influencing factor; government punishment; Xinjiang
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
