A study of coupled incentive-based clearing mechanisms in electricity markets considering uncertainty risk

Abstract

Abstract Promoting the construction of the electricity spot market and considering the market-oriented trading mode with joint participation of the generation side and load side and fair competition will be the trend of future development of the electricity spot market. The unit generation bidding strategy is adjusted by this paper based on incentive factors and an incentive-based clearing mechanism is designed for market coupling. To establish a coupled two-layer model of the power market, the upper layer of the heterogeneous generator bidding strategy modeling, the lower layer of the incentive-based market clearing mechanism modeling. On this basis, a spot market model is designed in which both the generation and user sides participate in peaking, and the peaking resources on the generation side and the user side are included in the market mechanism bidding. This paper’s clearing cost can save 854.42 yuan compared to the unified clearing mechanism in the bidding stage for clearing the total market electricity energy volume of 1000kW. The total carbon emissions are reduced by 5816.8 tons in a single day when compared to the single electric energy trading mechanism, which is based on the market-coupled incentive system. The market model proposed in the paper can effectively improve the level of new energy consumption and provide a useful reference for the design of the electricity market in regions with a high proportion of new energy.