A STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

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Abstract : For more than 20 years the principal thrust of U.S. foreign policy clearly has been containment of Communist expansionism, especially when it took the form of outright aggression. Until very recently there was consensus in the United States on the value and propriety of that policy, despite a continuous lack of consensus on how the underlying theory of Flexible containment could or should be achieved. This article addresses the following questions: What was the genesis of the strategy of Flexible Response?; To what extent was the underlying theory of Flexible Response adhered to after the strategy was adopted in the early 1960s?; and Is the strategy still valid? General Maxwell Taylor's Program of Flexible Response consisted essentially of five key elements. First, modernize and protect the strategic nuclear forces to insure that they could survive a Soviet attack in sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable levels of damage upon the Soviet Union. Second, immediately begin a major effort to revitalize the capability of all three services to conduct warfare at levels below general or all-out war and, though the services should maintain their tactical nuclear capabilities, principal emphasis should be placed on their ability to fight with conventional weapons. Third, establish a strong and highly ready force of active duty units in the continental United States as a backup reserve force for both our deployed forces and for our allies. Fourth, modernize and increase the size of air and sealift forces to provide a major capability for the rapid deployment of the active duty forces in the United States, and for resupply of all committed forces. Fifth, develop antisubmarine forces adequate for surveillance of Soviet submarine forces and for defense against enemy submarines.