Abstract
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), unlicensed users, that is, sensor nodes, have excessively exploited the unlicensed radio spectrum. Through Cognitive Radio (CR), licensed radio spectra, which are owned by licensed users, can be partly or entirely shared with unlicensed users. This paper proposes a strategic bargaining spectrum-sharing scheme, considering a CR-based heterogeneous WSN (HWSN). The sensors of HWSNs are discrepant and exist in different wireless environments, which leads to various signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) for the same or different licensed users. Unlicensed users bargain with licensed users regarding the spectrum price. In each round of bargaining, licensed users are allowed to adaptively adjust their spectrum price to the best for maximizing their profits. . Then, each unlicensed user makes their best response and informs licensed users of “bargaining” and “warning”. Through finite rounds of bargaining, this scheme can obtain a Nash bargaining solution (NBS), which makes all licensed and unlicensed users reach an agreement. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can quickly find a NBS and all players in the game prefer to be honest. The proposed scheme outperforms existing schemes, within a certain range, in terms of fairness and trade success probability.
Highlights
With the development of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), the radio spectrum resource, as one of the scarcest and expensive resources, gradually became a stumbling block
In a Cognitive Radio (CR)-based WSN [4,5,6], the spectrum demand for a licensed user directly depends on unit price and spectrum efficiency
We have proved the existence of some Nash equilibria, but what we need is at least one subgame-perfect equilibrium in strategic bargaining
Summary
With the development of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), the radio spectrum resource, as one of the scarcest and expensive resources, gradually became a stumbling block. To obtain the practicability and adaptability, the central controller (e.g., base station or auctioneer) cannot exist in the spectrum sharing model and there is no cooperation between licensed or unlicensed. To complete the spectrum trade between multiple licensed users and multiple unlicensed users, a non-cooperative strategic bargaining game was proposed to model the competition. To complete the spectrum trade between multiple licensed usersregarding and Nashmultiple bargaining [23,24]users, and HWSNs [8] is lacking; this paper proposes a scheme unlicensed a non-cooperative strategic bargaining game was proposed to model the that competition. Information, non-cooperative game model no the discrepancies (e.g., hardware, the space, and wireless environment) longer needsunlicensed a central users controller (base between are taken intostation account.or auctioneer).
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