Abstract
The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible with indeterminism: an indeterministic world allows for the existence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image, the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism. It is, however, of great importance for our self‐conception as free agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world. We begin by explicating the notions of indeterminism and free agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the human‐specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism precisely in the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism, exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we proceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise, physically motivated model of projective simulation, which employs indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling. We argue that an indeterministic process of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simulation can exemplify free agency under indeterminism, thereby establishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and thrive in an indeterministic world.
Highlights
Can there be free agency, a capacity exemplified by humans as well as by many nonhuman animals, if the world is indeterministic? This question is arguably more important than its mirror image, the question whether free agency is compatible with determinism
Given the layout of the dialectical landscape just described, we can say precisely what the aim of our paper is: We aim to establish claim (IndCom) of the compatibility of indeterminism and free agency, via a direct route: We will provide a possible scenario in which both free agency and indeterminism can be exemplified. In this paper we do not take a stance on the compatibility question for determinism
We have proposed a novel approach to the question whether there can be free agency under indeterminism
Summary
Can there be free agency, a capacity exemplified by humans as well as by many nonhuman animals, if the world is indeterministic? This question is arguably more important than its mirror image, the question whether free agency is compatible with determinism. In our model, indeterminism turns out to be a valuable resource that free agency can be based on, rather than a disturbing influence as often assumed. This provides a fresh perspective on the role of indeterminism in action. In stressing the importance of a positive ‘how possibly’ argument for the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism, we hope to help to clarify the dialectics of the debate about freedom and determinism. We describe the dialectics of the free agency/determinism debate and thereby situate our paper in the context of a broader discussion. In this paper we address the interrelation of two important concepts, one actiontheoretical – free agency – and one metaphysical – determinism.
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