Abstract

In this study, a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, or between different units within an instrument, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Our present study investigates the DC ground loop situation when no AC or EMI effects are present. Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison-based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leaks) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated and proposed defense methods against the attack are shown.

Highlights

  • On Secure CommunicationsCommunications systems, standards, and technologies have been developed since ancient times

  • We introduce a new passive attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme

  • In the DC limit, such parasite voltages and currents could cause information leaks

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Summary

On Secure Communications

Communications systems, standards, and technologies have been developed since ancient times. An important requirement of any communication paradigm between these devices is to accomplish secure communication, i.e., to protect the privacy and integrity of users’ data that is transferred over the network. To achieve the security of transferred data which can contain sensitive information (e.g., bank account credentials, social security number, etc.) it is of utmost importance to defend against attacks. These attacks might be launched by an eavesdropper (Eve) who has access to the information channel between the communicating parties. The attack is passive if it eavesdrops without disturbing the channel. The attack is active (invasive) if Eve disturbs or changes the channel, such as with a man-in-the-middle attack. We introduce a new passive attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme

Secure Key Exchange
Conditional Security
On the KLJN Secure Key Distribution
The Attack Scheme
Simulation Results
Some of the Possible Defense Techniques Against the Attack
Conclusions
Full Text
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