A STAMP-Game model for accident analysis in oil and gas industry

Systems theoretic accident model and process (STAMP): A literature review

Comparison of the theoretical elements and application characteristics of STAMP, FRAM, and 24Model: A major hazardous chemical explosion accident

An urban pipeline accident model based on system engineering and game theory

Systemic approaches to incident analysis in aviation: Comparison of STAMP, agent-based modelling and institutions

The hybrid systems method integrating STAMP and HFACS for the causal analysis of the road traffic accident

Automated inspection method for an STAMP/STPA - Fallen Barrier Trap at Railroad Crossing -

A CAST-based causal analysis of the catastrophic underground pipeline gas explosion in Taiwan

Application of systems thinking accident analysis methods: A review for railways

A System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process with Human Factors Analysis and Classification System taxonomy

What do applications of systems thinking accident analysis methods tell us about accident causation? A systematic review of applications between 1990 and 2018

The traditional safety analysis method is based on the event chain theory, which is not suitable for analyzing the accident caused by components interaction problems of complex system. However, the System Theoretic Accident Model and Process(STAMP) can overcome this difficulty. There are some shortcomings in the current research on STAMP, such as describing the model with natural language and relying on manual analysis. Therefore, this paper proposes a components interaction safety analysis method based on STAMP and formal verification. Taking the aero-engine control system as an example, the root cause of system hazard is obtained and the feasibility of the proposed method is verified.

The System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) considers safety as a dynamic problem by focusing on interactions among system components rather than on component failure. However, analyzing complex system risks with STAMP can be challenging due to manual processes. Therefore, software tools supporting STAMP analysis have been developed. An evaluation of five tools (ASTAH, STPA, Capella, XSTAMPP, STPA Master Lite, and Visio Pro) was conducted, focusing on systems of systems (SoS) risk analysis. While all tools demonstrated compliance with the STAMP risk analysis procedure, with some tools offering additional features, a shortcoming in scalability limits the support for risk analysis of SoS. This makes risk analysis with the available STAMP tools challenging for SoS. Recommended enhancements include mechanisms to address SoS characteristics, scalability, collaboration, and improved usability. The study contributes to research on SoS risk analysis and provides direction for advancement in risk analysis tool support.

Using systems theory for additional risk detection in boiler explosions in Brazil

A new accident causation theory based on systems thinking and its systemic accident analysis method of work systems

Despite the growing share of renewable sources, the world energy matrix still depends heavily on fossil fuels, especially oil. The exploration of this product brings severe challenges and risks which must be managed during all phases of an oil well’s lifetime. Analysis methodologies have already been developed and established to contribute to safety; however, with the growing complexity of the system, these methodologies may need a more structured way to identify some arising loss scenarios. The System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) deals with this problem. STAMP is a causality model that, attacking the problem from different paradigms, treats safety as a control problem, shifting emphasis from preventing failures to enforcing safety constraints. Based on a system model that spells out the control levels of a system and the control and feedback interactions between them, named SCS (Safety Control Structure), it focuses on preventing those interactions that lead the system to a hazardous condition, making it vulnerable to losses. This paper presents an analysis technique built on STAMP named System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), applied in the case of a submarine oil well at the production phase to highlight the benefits of using STAMP as a complement to more traditional analysis methodologies. The results conclude that STPA analysis can identify safety breaches from different sources. The first relevant source relates to the component failure events — also covered by more conventional methods such as PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment). The most significant contribution relates to safety breaches related to components interaction, managerial decisions, organizational factors, and others. The latter are manageable by structuring the loss scenario generation, which is the primary goal of STAMP.