A Stackelberg game-based dynamic pricing and robust optimization strategy for microgrid operations

Abstract

Energy management algorithms of microgrids have attracted growing attention for the efficient operation and coordination of active end-users. In developing these algorithms, leader–follower game approaches could provide effective strategies when the behavioral and operational characteristics of active end-users are integrated into the methodology. However, since these approaches require the exact implementation of the strategy determined by the leader, it is of great importance to deal with the uncertainty of renewable energy generation, charging/discharging energy of storage systems, and load consumption. Thus, possible negative effects of these uncertainties on the outcome can be minimized with an appropriate billing procedure. In this paper, a Stackelberg game approach is proposed for the energy sharing management of a microgrid including prosumers and plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging stations (CSs), and a proper billing scheme is designed to increase the robustness of the approach on real-time applications. In the hereby game-theoretic approach, the energy demands of PEV CSs are determined as variable demands considering the operational characteristics of CSs. The energy planning of CSs is based on determining the number of PEVs that each station can accept over the vehicle charging levels for a specified time interval. Also, by the necessary modifications identified for the presented approach, the microgrid can operate independently from the utility grid and satisfy the requirements of islanded mode for the time slots in which the microgrid exchanges energy with the grid based on the end-game results. The energy management strategy proposed in this study presents a comprehensive solution capable of optimizing energy sharing in microgrids while taking into account end-users’ operational characteristics and network requirements. Furthermore, the designed billing scheme ensures that the accuracy of the proposed game approach remains unaffected by the uncertainties, thus preserving the microgrid’s profit.