Abstract
In this paper, we establish a social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents, which is an infinite-player extension of the fully cooperative version of Ichiishi (1981). As a unified approach, we obtain the weak α-core existence theorems of normal-form games and exchange economies with a continuum of agents by the social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem.
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