Abstract

We develop a simple decision model of counterproliferation involving a status quo “incumbent” and a nuclear “entrant”. The problem is examined as a one-stage interaction in two phases: nuclear development and deployment. We examine the conditions that will influence the decision to move pre-emptively against a proliferator's nuclear program. Particular attention is given to the role of uncertainty in determining the expected costs of action at different points in the entrant's weapon's development and deployment cycle. The model permits us to determine the optimal time to act given varying levels of information concerning entrant behavior. In conclusion, we examine the tradeoffs between the expected costs of action and the costs of intelligence.

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