A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization

Abstract

This essay presents a sequential choice theory of legislative organization as an alternative to social choice theories. Because of the sequential process of proposal making and voting, sequential choice theory yields equilibrium predictions for both particularistic goods programs and unidimensional and multidimensional collective goods programs. The theory thus does not require legislative organization and procedures to yield stability. Although this study does not present a formal theory of the choice of legislative organization, sequential choice theory allows an assessment of collective and individualistic incentives for the choice of legislative organization and procedures. For example, the legislature has collective incentives to control individualistic incentives and can exercise control by allowing amendments to committee proposals. Sequential choice theory also addresses the durability issue that arises because current legislatures cannot bind future legislatures. In the theory, legislators position programs strategically to limit future changes. As Shepsle and Weingast indicate in their contribution to this volume, theories of legislative organization are based on an underlying body of social choice theory. The principal objective of this study is to offer an alternative theory-a sequential choice theory-as a basis for reasoning about collective choice and legislative organization. In the terminology of Shepsle and Weingast, sequential choice theory is a substitute for social choice theory in that it is not built on the results of that theory, and therefore the central issues it addresses are somewhat different. For example, sequential choice theory does not share with social choice theory the notion that institutions, other than a minimal legislative process, are necessary to capture the gains from cooperation nor that an exchange of rights is central to that capture. Instead, the theory is based on a sequential process of proposal making and voting that yields equilibrium behavior and outcomes and provides an alternative perspective on legislative organization. There are analogies between the approaches, however. The legislative implications of social choice theory are drawn from equilibria