A Security Analysis of Circuit Clock Obfuscation

Abstract

Key-based circuit obfuscation or logic-locking is a technique that can be used to hide the full design of an integrated circuit from an untrusted foundry or end-user. The technique is based on creating ambiguity in the original circuit by inserting “key” input bits into the circuit such that the circuit is unintelligible absent a correct secret key. Clock signals have traditionally been avoided in locking in order to not corrupt the timing behavior of the locked circuit. In this paper, we explore the case where the clock signal itself may be obfuscated by ambiguating its frequency or pattern. Along with discussing formal notions of security in this context, we present practical ways to deobfuscate such designs using techniques from multi-rate model-checking. We present experimental data on deobfuscation runtime on a set of sequential benchmark circuits. Our results show that naive random clock obfuscation may not provide more security per overhead than traditional random keyed-gate insertion. We discuss how clock obfuscation may be a more attractive choice for special circuit designs that are inherently multi-clock/asynchronous.