Abstract
In 1999 Silverman [] introduced a family of binary finite fields which are composite extensions of F2 and on which arithmetic operations can be performed more quickly than on prime extensions of F2 of the same size.We present here a fast approach to elliptic curve cryptography using a distinguished subset of the set of Silverman fields F2 N = F h n. This approach leads to a theoretical computation speedup over fields of the same size, using a standard point of view (cf. []). We also analyse their security against prime extension fields F2 p, where p is prime, following the method of Menezes and Qu []. We conclude that our fields do not present any significant weakness towards the solution of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and that often the Weil descent of Galbraith-Gaudry-Hess-Smart (GGHS) does not offer a better attack on elliptic curves defined over F 2 N than on those defined over F 2 p , with a prime p of the same size as N.A noteworthy example is provided by F 2 226 : a generic elliptic curve Y 2 + XY = X 3 + αX 2 + β defined over F2 226 is as prone to the GGHS Weil descent attack as a generic curve defined on the NIST field F2 223.
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