A Risk-Averse Energy Sharing Market Game for Renewable Energy Microgrid Aggregators

Abstract

Energy sharing has the potential to decrease operation costs by exploiting the complementarity of different entities. The further increase of microgrids’ generation capacity in the distribution network could trigger the emergence of MW-level microgrids aggregator (MGA) to participate in the regional energy sharing market (ESM) and sell excess energy. However, the uncertainty of renewable energy generation will cause the failure of energy sharing and an economic loss for the energy sharing market. Therefore, a novel two-sided market with the clearing price and risk management is proposed in this paper. In order to optimize the energy sharing strategy of MGAs, a network-constrained risk-averse two-stage stochastic game model based on DC optimal power flow (OPF) is established. The objective of the MGA is to maximize the revenue in the ESM while the subtransmission network operator (SNO) aims to achieve regional energy self-sufficiency. The sample average approximation (SAA) method is employed to approximate the stochastic Cournot-Nash equilibrium. A distributed market clearing algorithm based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) and best response seeking is developed to solve the optimal bidding problem of MGAs and the optimal dispatch problem of the SNO. Furthermore, the existence of the SAA Nash equilibrium is also investigated. Numerical simulations prove that the proposed game model can effectively control the overbidding risk and promote regional energy self-sufficiency.