A Retrospective Look at Clinical Pragmatics

Abstract

Approximately 20 years ago when I was a graduate student in the psycholinguistics and speech-language pathology programs at the University of Illinois, Tom Shriner, Carol Prutting, and I began our endless discussions about pragmatics, although we didn’t use that term then. We were trying to integrate three modes of thinking about language that existed in three physically distinct locations on campus. One mode of thinking about language was linguistics. In linguistics classes we discussed Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar, a language theory with such profound implications that it was receiving extraordinary attention even in the popular literature. Chomsky’s theory rested on three fundamental assumptions. One was that the domain of linguistic theory was the characterization of the abstract rules of language as language competence rather than language performance. The second assumption was that the primary power of language resided in syntax. The third assumption was that knowledge of syntax could be described independently from the other levels of language knowledge, phonology and semantics. In linguistics classes we analyzed sentences as they “might be written on a blackboard” and we conceptualized language as an abstract, symbolic code. In psychology seminars, brilliant scholars, such as Charles Osgood, taught us about the principles of mediational behavioristic psychology and how these principles were evident in language performance. In these classes we discussed behavior and language. In speech-language pathology, we worked with children and adults who were language disordered. These people were having such difficulty communicating that their functional capabilities were reduced significantly from those of their chronological peer groups. Problems with trying to deal with communication difficulties by viewing language as simply a symbolic code, however elegant, or viewing language as simply another form of behavior were haunting. Although we did not have theoretical models that adequately characterized it as such or a vocabulary that provided a means for making clear references to it, we struggled with trying to deal with communication, language as behavior, with language as it was used by people in their daily lives. This meant that we somehow had to conceptualize language as a code that was used by people to do things. As I review the clinical literature over the last 20 years I think that my experience as a graduate student was to some extent a microcosm of the tensions and struggles that have characterized the study of language disorders itself.