A Restrained View of Transformation

Abstract

In A Transformative Theory of Religious Freedom: Promoting the Reasons for Rights, Corey Brettschneider argues that the liberal state has the right to try to certain beliefs: is those beliefs, religious and otherwise, that are openly hostile to or implausibly consistent with the values of equal citizenship that the state should seek to transform (195).1 This is a strong statement that Brettschneider qualifies in important ways, since he does not believe that state should wantonly seek to illiberal beliefs. He argues that when citizens try to impose their religious views on others through legislation that they should be stopped by the Court, and also told why it was wrong to try to do so, which is that it violates the tenets of equal citizenship (193). If being rebuked by the Court results in a transformation of their beliefs, all the better. Further, Brettschneider argues that a religious organization that receives state funds or tax-exempt status must adhere to the principles of equal citizenship. My dispute with Brettschneider is not with the idea of transformation itself, or the relatively uncontroversial idea that some religious groups should not be allowed to impose their views on others. But in cases where imposition is not an issue, we liberals should not be so quick to look to the state to directly practices that seem incompatible with equal citizenship. In looking at one notorious case, where Bob Jones University had its tax-exempt status revoked for its racially discriminatory policies (that have since been changed), Brettschneider announces: What makes Bob Jones's policy subject to transformation is its direct affront to the ideal of equal citizenship. The