Abstract

The work seeks to analyze the possibility of correlating the idea of integrity and the correct response of a judicial decision, arising from the work of Ronald Dworkin, and the assumptions of the meaning of politics as freedom in Hannah Arendt. The research problem is the constant diversity of arguments founding judicial decisions based on specific situations, or tangents to the field of law. The hypothesis raised in this work is that legal hermeneutics, necessary for the implementation of normative contents, is also a way of ensuring the freedom of individuals, and not just a set of techniques for translating the meaning of words. Hence the viable encounter between Dworkin, with the proposal of integrity, and Arendt, with the sense of plurality essentially linked to the notion of freedom, as both take politics as a highlight of their reflections. The methodology of the work is analytical and critical, with a focus on bibliographical research. The correct answer in Dworkin overcomes the theses of bivalence and linguistic sufficiency of positivist discretion. Therefore, the idea of integrity arises, which presupposes the reception, by any judge, or the one responsible for juditial decision, of philosophical, moral and political circumstances that emerge from any specific case, as much as from the surrounding community. In this last dimension, it is possible to see freedom as a political human action par excellence, in the wake of Arendt’s thought. In conclusion, a proposition is sugested, which is, that the integrity of interpretation is related to the political freedom of the community in which the judicial decision takes place.

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