Abstract
The corporate social responsibility component is radically transforming the way shareholders relate to their stakeholders and the society in which the company operates. Thus, there is an invitation for the performance of companies to be measured and evaluated not only based on shareholder returns, but also based on compliance with environmental, social and governance objectives, which, if met, end up generating positive and profitable reputational reflexes. However, due to the voluntary nature of corporate social responsibility, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are identified. The objective of this study is to analyze what can be effectively expected from the voluntary initiatives of company managers, who act on behalf of shareholders, but whose interests are not always aligned with theirs. For the development of the research, the hypothetical-deductive scientific method and the bibliographic research technique were used. Firstly, it was verified which were the initiatives in recent history that broke with the reductionist view of the market, as well as the importance of corporate social responsibility for the reputation of companies. Next, the agency conflicts that arise between managers and shareholders in such a context were analyzed, weighing the externalities generated to society as a whole. At the end, the conclusions of this work were presented, in which the importance of institutional mechanisms to transform social responsibility into effective internal policies was analyzed, aligning the objectives of all those involved in the business activity to each specific case.
Published Version
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