Abstract
Land finance, i.e., a city government’s revenue, depends deeply on the revenue from transferring multiannual land use rights and is a phenomenon unique to China. However, due to increasingly tense land supply, increasingly prominent social conflicts, and the slowdown of urbanization in China, the country is entering what we may label the “post-land finance” era. Therefore, revenue from land finance is decreasing, which threatens the sustainability of Chinese city governments’ debt, especially in major cities. This paper tests the long-term sustainability of major Chinese city governments’ debt. Different from intuition, the empirical results show that the debt of these major city governments is still sustainable at the macro level. This paper also constructs a quadratic function model to predict the critical value of the local government debt. Our results suggest that despite the fact that debt is still sustainable, critical value may be reached quickly, as debt is growing rapidly. There is thus a need for local fiscal reform that divides financial power and authority between the local governments and the central government more reasonable and clearly, improves the current assessment mechanism of local governments’ officials, and speeds up the legislative work on property taxes.
Highlights
A significant portion of the gross domestic product of most industrialized countries is produced in their metropolitan regions: cities, towns, and other local government (LG) entities
Land finance can be viewed from two perspectives: From the perspective of the central government, it is a policy to increase the urbanization of China, and from the perspective of LGs, it is a source of capital local revenue
Current relevant literature is focused on provincial governments, while there is a gap in the literature on the sustainability of debt in China’s major city governments from the perspective of post-land finance era
Summary
A significant portion of the gross domestic product of most industrialized countries is produced in their metropolitan regions: cities, towns, and other local government (LG) entities. LGs buy the land collectively owned by peasants, usually at a low price with the aim to urbanize. This way the ownership of these lands is converted from collective ownership to public ownership, and this represents the land finance expenditure. It should be emphasized that the transfer from LGs to the developers refers to the land use rights, which is usually 70 years, not the ownership. Land finance can be viewed from two perspectives: From the perspective of the central government, it is a policy to increase the urbanization of China, and from the perspective of LGs, it is a source of capital local revenue. Data source: Website of Ministry of Finance of People’s Republic of China
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.