A Reply to Antony Flew

Abstract

In 'James Giles on Personal Identity' Antony Flew raises several points against my 'Bodily Theory and Theory of the Body'2. In that paper I criticize the bodily theory of personal identity on the ground that it is based on an inadequate theory of the body; that is, that it only considers the body from the third-person perspective, and completely overlooks the body from the first-person perspective. Flew objects to the way in which I present my argument claiming that I am describing our reflexive experiences of ourselves 'as if this involved transactions between two separable substances'. Consequently, he feels, I 'take for granted the very PlatonicCartesian assumptions that are in dispute' (p. 394). As evidence of this he then quotes the opening sentence of my paper: 'What is it about having a body that might dispose us to think it a plausible candidate for the basis of personal identity?'. This question, he says, only makes sense on the assumption that embodiment is a mere contingency. But why is it that Flew thinks this question carries with it dualistic assumptions? Although he does not explain, maybe Flew thinks that the phrase 'having a body', implies the existence of two separate things; namely, a body and something else that contingently has the body, this something else being the incorporeal self of Cartesianism. But if this is true, then by the same reasoning it seems that 'having four sides' as in 'a square's having four sides' should also imply the existence of two separate things; namely, 'four sides' and something else that contingently has the four sides; that is, a square. But this is false simply because a square is not something which exists apart from its four sides. In other words, a square's relation to its four sides is not one of contingency. And this remains true despite the fact that the word 'having' can be properly used to describe the relation that a square has to its four sides. Of course the word 'having' or 'have' can also be used to describe contingent relationships such as 'I have an apple' or, to give Flew's example, 'some of us just happen to have skins with Philosophy, 67, 261 (July 1992), 394-398. Further references are included in the text.