A Rediscovery of Consciousness

Abstract

In his recent book, Searle claims that more than anything else, the neglect of consciousness is responsible for so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. He proposes to locate consciousness in the natural world by breaking with the materialist tradition now reigning in these fields of inquiry into mind and behavior. In Searle′s view, consciousness is a physical, spatial, biological, intrinsic feature of certain brain states and processes. However, he holds that consciousness is (a) a first-person, subjective feature of conscious brain states and processes and (b) not possibly identical to any of the third-person, objective features of conscious brain states and processes, although (c) proximally caused by certain of these third-person features. Searle argues, as well, that the mentality of nonconscious mental states and processes consists entirely in their producing, barring interference, corresponding conscious brain states or processes. I examine Searle′s ontological feature of subjectivity, including how conscious brain states and processes are themselves objects of consciousness; why Searle holds that the first-person features of conscious brain states and processes must be distinct from all third-person features; and Searle′s claim that no nonconscious mental state possesses intentionality since it is not conscious.