A Recursive Model for Changing Justice Concerns in Social Dilemmas

Abstract

In 2003, we (Schroeder et al., 2003) presented an analysis of justice concerns and considerations of fairness within social dilemma situations. At that time, we perceived the various types of justice criteria (i.e., distributive, procedural, restorative, retributive) as evolving in a more or less sequential manner as the status of a common resource pool or the threat to a public good changed for the worse over time. Social dilemmas are intriguing mixed-motive situations in which those involved must make choices between acting in their own best interests versus acting for the well-being of a group, and the decisions made can lead to unequal outcomes among the group members. These asymmetries make social dilemma situations particularly well suited for the study of how members of these groups strive to find fair and just accommodations to the self-interest vs. communal interest conflicts operating upon them. Because many social dilemmas are iterative and dynamic, they also provide an excellent context within which to explore how these accommodations might shift over time as the parameters of the situation change as a consequence of the choices made by the group (see Ostrom, 1990, for examples). For instance, in the case of common pool dilemmas, as people repeatedly harvest from some resource pool and thereby alter the status of the resource, the consideration that needs to be given to the protection of the pool (and especially to the protection of one’s own outcomes) will be modified as well. We think individuals caught in social dilemmas look for solutions and social arrangements that will provide a measure of stability to answer the longitudinal concerns of how they are going to protect this common pool or how they are going to provide for the public good. In addition to concerns for the stability and continued viability of some common good, we believe potential or actual differences among the payoffs received by group members may challenge the cooperator’s sense of fairness and justice; individuals disadvantaged by the competitive actions of others may begin to question their role as “suckers” in their group settings. If, as former baseball manager Leo Durocher once said, “Nice guys finish last,” what are the “losers” to do? Overharvesters in common pools dilemmas and free riders in public-good dilemmas are always going to be at a competitive advantage relative to the cooperators, and we think that those who have been disadvantaged (as well as some who recognize the folly of defecting but have nonetheless continued to overharvest or free-ride to protect themselves from