Standards of justice and quality of power in a social dilemma situation

Abstract

In most social dilemma studies (Dawes, 1980), participants have equal access to the common resources. In this study one group member—the powerholder—was able to take three times as many outcomes as the average group member. In half of the groups this ability of the powerholder was acquired by previous effort expenditure (the merit condition); in the other half of the groups the power was usurped (the usurpation condition). Mulder's power theory (Mulder, 1972) predicts that difference in quality of power has no effect, while other insights (e.g. Austin & Hatfield, 1980) suggest that legitimation has an impact on the behaviour of other participants. In half of the groups the powerholder took three times as much as the average group member. Insights derived from social justice literature (Austin & Hatfield, 1980) suggest that when the powerholder takes more than the average fellow group member—this being so in the so‐called proportional outcomes condition—then the proportionality standard of justice will be introduced. Consequently, his or her fellow group members should take fewer outcomes than in the equal outcomes condition, in which the powerholder takes as many outcomes as the average group member and in which the equality standard of justice may be assumed to be introduced by the powerholder. Using a 2 (usurpation vs. merit) x 2 (proportional vs. equal outcomes) design, several hypotheses were tested in a social dilemma situation. The results indicate that Mulder's quality of power hypothesis was supported, i.e. legitimation had no effect on the ‘harvesting’ behaviour of regular group members. However, a legitimate powerholder later received more social support than a usurper (cf. French & Raven, 1959). The standard of justice hypothesis (Austin & Hatfield, 1980) was sustained, since regular group members in the proportional outcomes condition took fewer outcomes than those in the equal outcomes condition.