A Proposal for the Distribution Abroad of the United States' Food Surplus

Abstract

O NE of the more embarrassing by-products of the United States' farm problem has been the accumulation in recent years of stocks of surplus crops. These surpluses enable others to picture the United States as hoarding food while millions in other lands go hungry. For some time it has been evident that it would be highly desirable to use the United States' farm surplus as economic aid to populous countries, especially those with severe food problems; indeed, some steps have already been taken to do this under the Food for Peace program, and more have been suggested. However, the United States government has properly hesitated to make really full-scale efforts in this direction, at least partly because of the probable effect which such efforts would have on the food export markets of such close allies as Canada and Australia, as well as of such rice producers as Burma. This paper proposes, in broad outline, a possible method of expanding the Food for Peace program in such a way that the food export markets of friendly nations are not damaged. We are concerned, however, only with the problems raised by the undesirability of dumping our surplus on such export markets. There are certainly likely to be other problems involved in an expanded surplus disposal program, but these we do not discuss. It is hoped that despite the unrealism involved, this paper will stimulate useful discussions. Let us begin by listing the features that a plan for disposal of the surplus should have: i. The plan should provide for disposal of the surplus with a minimum of disturbance to the export markets of friendly nations. Also, it should be added that it would be desirable for the plan not to aggravate or induce balance of payments or foreign exchange problems in participating countries.' 2. Benefits under the plan should accrue primarily to those nations at which the program is primarily aimed. It seems poor strategy to adopt a plan such that the Communists can claim (falsely but plausibly) that we are really benefiting only ourselves and our rich capitalist allies at the expense of the poorer nations of the world. Moreover, while there is no objection as such to other food importers (the United Kingdom, for example) benefiting from the program, this clearly should not be allowed to happen at the expense of the underdeveloped countries at whom the program is primarily aimed. (We shall henceforth refer to the latter nations as countries.) 3. It should be clear to all that it is not possible for any country or group of countries to increase its benefits under the plan at the expense of the United States or of other exporting or beneficiary nations by deliberately falsifying its needs. Preferably, the plan should be selfpolicing in this respect that is, such clarity should not be achieved by sanctions external to the workings of the program. 4. Consistent with the other points, the program should cost the United States as little as possible. Of course, it is perfectly reasonable to subtract from the costs of the program the costs of storing the surplus which would be saved by the disposal thereof.