A Probabilistic Approach to Moral Responsibility

Abstract

Publisher Summary The chapter discusses a probabilistic approach to moral responsibility. The probabilistic considerations cast on confirmation theory and decision theory. The chapter argues that they also cast light on assessments of moral responsibility, most particularly of guilt or blameworthiness, both in general and in the notoriously tricky cases of negligence and culpable ignorance. The chapter elaborates on two very well-known ideas. One is well known in Ethics, the other in Decision Theory. Their combination gives the theory of one element in being morally guilty. The chapter indicates how the theory gives the intuitively correct answers in two relatively simple cases. A remark on the principle of alternate possibilities is discussed. The chapter describes negligence, culpable ignorance, and recklessness, and cases of culpability without wrongdoing. The chapter considers the Morgan Rape Case from the point of view of our theory.