Abstract

The mainstream theories and models of the physical sciences, including neuroscience, are all consistent with the principle of causality. Wholly causal explanations make sense of how things go, but are inherently value-neutral, providing no objective basis for true beliefs being better than false beliefs, nor for it being better to intend wisely than foolishly. Dennett (1987) makes a related point in calling the brain a syntactic (procedure-based) engine. He says that you cannot get to a semantic (meaning-based) engine from there. He suggests that folk psychology revolves around an intentional stance that is independent of the causal theories of the brain, and accounts for constructs such as meanings, agency, true belief, and wise desire. Dennett proposes that the intentional stance is so powerful that it can be developed into a valid intentional theory. This article expands Dennett’s model into a principle of intentionality that revolves around the construct of objective wisdom. This principle provides a structure that can account for all mental processes, and for the scientific understanding of objective value. It is suggested that science can develop a far more complete worldview with a combination of the principles of causality and intentionality than would be possible with scientific theories that are consistent with the principle of causality alone.

Highlights

  • One powerful approach to theorizing about how things go in the world is by model-building

  • Model-building in the area of folk psychology is discussed in Maibom (2003) and Godfrey-Smith (2005)

  • Virtually all scientific explanation of change occurs in the form of models

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

One powerful approach to theorizing about how things go in the world is by model-building. If it turns out to be valid, this will empower models of the mind that might be far more powerful than any wholly causal model of mental processes can be It might offer powerful models of objective value and purpose, with implications in other human sciences beyond psychology. The focus of this article will be a bit more modest: an intentional model for predicting and explaining mental processes within the science of psychology, descriptive of minds but not prescriptive of behavior It will become clear how such a model might someday lead to significant scientific investigation of objective values, but perhaps only in the distant future. It is reasonable to suspect that models of the mind and models of the brain will tend toward identical predictions of human behavior, while offering dramatically different explanations

THE DENNETTIAN MODEL
THE INTENTIONAL RELATION
WISDOM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INTENTIONALITY
THE INTENTIONAL MODEL AND MAINSTREAM PSYCHOLOGY
EXPLAINING INTENTIONS WITHIN WHOLLY CAUSAL MODELS
PUTTING THE INTENTIONAL MODEL INTO CONTEXT
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

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