Abstract
Existing end-to-end security mechanisms are vulnerable to path-based denial of service attacks (PDoS). If checking integrity and authenticity of a message is done only at the final destination, the intermediate nodes are going to forward bogus packets injected by an adversary many hops before they are detected. Therefore, the adversary can easily overwhelm intermediate nodes by bogus or replayed packets. This attack exhausts the nodes along the path. In addition, other downstream nodes that depend on the exhausted nodes as intermediate nodes will be isolated, and they have to find alternative paths. Regarding broadcast traffic that originated from the base station, if packets were injected by an adversary, the whole network's nodes will be exhausted. Therefore, there is a need to enable intermediate nodes to filter out bogus packets. We adopted a link layer security scheme to enable en route intermediate nodes to filter out any bogus or replayed packet as soon as it is injected into the network. Our scheme can handle different types of traffic. Simulation results show that our algorithm outperforms the one-way hash chain (OHC) algorithm and that it is more scalable.
Highlights
With the rapid development and wide application of wireless sensor networks (WSN), more and more security problems are emerging
We have conducted simulation studies to evaluate the performance of NPfDPDoS and the one-way hash chain (OHC) algorithms
They supposed that the base station will send μTESLA packets for initializing the intermediate nodes, which is very difficult as the base station will have to know the positions of nodes that are randomly deployed
Summary
With the rapid development and wide application of wireless sensor networks (WSN), more and more security problems are emerging. Due to the unique characteristics and challenges in WSN, traditional security techniques used in traditional networks cannot be directly applied. Sensor devices are limited in their energy, computation, and communication capabilities. Sensor nodes are often deployed in accessible areas which make the sensors vulnerable to physical attacks. Since the communication medium in WSN is a broadcast wireless medium, adversaries can eavesdrop on, intercept, inject, and alter transmitted data. Adversaries can overwhelm intermediate nodes with bogus or replayed packets to drain their batteries and waste network bandwidth. The adversary can make the victim node store invalid information to exhaust its memory and, leave no room for storing useful information
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