A note on reading Austin

Abstract

In his review article on my /. L. Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy1 Mats Furberg makes a number of comments about my "exegetical trustworthiness" in relation to Austin (p. 471). He describes my account of ordinary language philosophy as "at best a journalist's caricature" (p. 466), he refers to my "inability to read from the book", and his conclusion is that my own book "will not do as an exposition and criticism either of Austin or of the basic assumptions of 'linguistic philosophy'." (p. 472) My aim in this Note is to argue (i) that in those cases cited by Furberg where Austin straightforwardly expressed views on method my exegesis is not deficient, (ii) that Furberg himself achieves less than is required by way of sound exegesis in the account he gives of my own and Austin's positions, and (iii) what may seem at first sight surprising that even if I had been exegetically inept in the way Furberg suggested, this would not have affected the validity of the central claim in my book about Austin's philosophical method. Two preliminary points of a general kind. Furberg distinguishes between writings which Austin himself published and posthumous reconstructions, as he is fully entitled to. I did make clear at the outset, however, that in my book I would consider all works, includ ing posthumous ones, which had produced noteworthy acceptance or reaction in other philosophers, since it was Austin as an actual historical influence that I was concerned with (J. L. Austin, p. 1). Secondly, it is disappointing to see Furberg speaking in a blanket way of "linguistic philosophy" when I also set out to make clear that such labels obscure a diversity of approaches to the subject which are of varying soundness (JLA, p. 6). It was the particular method adopted by Austin and similar philosophers which was the object of my criticism. Furberg begins by ascribing to me five views about Austin (p. 467). Only in the case of one of these does he refer to or quote from my argument, viz. my claim that for Austin "what we do or would say is, because of its proven fitness, what we ought to say" (JLA, p. 44). Furberg objects to this, as he does to my claim that there is something