Abstract
It is shown that under incomplete information it may be optimal for a monopolist to ration a single price taker in addition to setting prices, which is in contrast to the case of complete information. As a byproduct it is shown that the star-shaped hull of the offer curve of a price taker exactly consists of the points that can be supported as Drèze-optima.
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