Abstract
In this article I will review McGee's famous counterexample to Modus Ponens and I will argue that it is not a real counterexample. I will claim that the problem lies in an infelicitous assertion of the second premise. As result of this diagnosis, I will suggest that when dealing with indicative conditionals a pragmatic theory is needed.
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