Abstract

This paper investigates the secure communication issue for cognitive radio networks with nonaltruistic users. The design objective is to improve the secrecy rate of the primary user (PU) and, at the same time, create transmission opportunities for the secondary users (SUs) to satisfy their diversified quality-of-service (QoS) demands. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel nonmonetary trading model, where the users are incentivized to participate in the market by a barter-like resource-to-resource exchange. Specifically, the PU leverages the assistance of the SU in the form of cooperative forwarding or friendly jamming and yields part of the spectrum accessing time to the aided SU. The proposed spectrum auction framework jointly formulates the optimal cooperator selection and the corresponding resource allocation problems by taking into consideration the QoS demands of individual users. The proposed framework ensures that bidding truthfully is the dominant strategy for all bidders and, thus, is invulnerable to market manipulation and eliminates the overhead of strategizing over other bidders. Simulation results reveal that the proposed framework could provide substantial gains for both the PU and the aided SU.

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