DASI: A truthful double auction mechanism for secure information transfer in cognitive radio networks

Abstract

This paper investigates the secure information transfer issue for cognitive radio networks that have multiple non-altruistic primary users, secondary users and eavesdroppers. The design objective is to improve the secrecy rates of the primary users, and create the transmission opportunities for the secondary users. To achieve this goal, we propose to incentivize the non-altruistic users to cooperate by a barter-like exchange. Specifically, the primary users leverage the assist of the secondary users in the form of cooperative transmitting or friendly jamming, and in return, yield certain licensed spectrum accessing time to the aided secondary users. We propose a truthful Double Auction mechanism for Secure Information transfer in cognitive radio networks, namely DASI, to jointly formulate the cooperator/jammer assignment and the corresponding resource allocation problems. We prove that DASI preserves nice economic properties that are critical for the auction design, including truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance. We also evaluate DASI in terms of aggregated throughput and spectrum utilization ratio by simulations.