Abstract
AbstractIn graph‐restricted cooperative games, a group of agents, represented by the nodes of a graph, work together to make a profit. However, two agents can cooperate within a coalition only if they are connected by the graph in the coalition. Several allocation rules have been proposed for these games, but there is something in common in all of them: if a player is an indispensable intermediary to communicate with the players in a coalition, this player will receive, at least, the same share of the profit generated by the coalition as the players who belong to it. In other words, intermediation power is valued, at least, as much as active cooperation. In some situations, this is neither fair nor realistic. In this paper, we introduce a family of values for graph‐restricted games that value intermediary power less than active cooperation.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
More From: International Transactions in Operational Research
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
