A Neo-Aristotelian Approach to a Unified Theory of Physics

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Abstract The core task of this paper is to demonstrate the heuristic merits of the Aristotelian philosophy of science as compared with the strict empiricism in constructing and justifying a unified theory of physics. The impetus for the study was the question of whether the success of the Dynamic Universe (DU) theory as a candidate for such a unification could be explained by energy as its basic notion (Suntola, T. 2018a, 2018b, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2024), while the other unificatory attempts (string theories, inflation theory, and loop quantum gravity), all based on the notion of force, appear to fail. DU’s reliance on Aristotle’s methodology of first principles and his potentiality-actuality metaphysics soon invited to explore DU’s Aristotelian presuppositions as an explanatory ground for its seeming success. A major weakness of empiricism is its rejection of metaphysical reflection, necessary for the revolutionary paradigm change in the unification project. While the empiricist negative stand towards metaphysics is based on its narrow conception of basis of knowledge and logical reasoning and the principle of methodological unity, Aristotelian solutions to these problems are difficult to refute. The Stagirite’s methodology of Saving the Appearances (SA), little known outside Aristotle scholarship, exposes ways of expanding the knowledge basis to make room for metaphysical knowledge. SA is valuable to our purposes here also by yielding a heuristic model for the discovery and justification of a unified theory of physics. Aristotle’s argument for the reality of potentiality in the form of an inference from a fact of life to its necessary presuppositions illustrates how to expand the empiricist premises-conclusion notion of logic. To specify the object of physics, the Aristotelian genus-species structure of reality exposes that the definition of the genus proximum constitutes the highest first principle of a theory. Applying Aristotle’s metaphysical notions of change and motion (dunamis, substance–attribute, matter-form), the genus proximum in DU turns out to be mass as prime substance, mass defined as the substance for the expression of energy. To conclude, I shall point to the need for modifying the Aristotelian metaphysical categories to allow room for the holism in DU. Having studied the heuristic principles underlying the DU theory, the paper contributes both to the emerging studies of the Meta-Empirical argument forms in physics and the recent Neo-Aristotelian approach in the philosophy of physics.