A neglected deflationist approach to the liar

Abstract

(1) is the simple liar; (2) is the strengthened liar; and (3) is the truth-teller. That these sentences engender paradox is familiar enough – so much so that no review is required. What do these familiar paradoxes teach us about our (English) language? To this question there are many different answers. The answer at issue in this paper is a common one; it is, perhaps, the most common initial response to the given paradoxes.1 The response in question is one according to which none of (1), (2), or (3) are meaningful; each of the given sentences, according to the going response, is meaningless – they ‘say nothing’, ‘express no proposition’, or so on. The trouble with the given response, and perhaps the reason that it tends to be only an initial response, is that it appears to be ad hoc, in addition to being implausible. The implausibility of the response arises from the fact that nobody has trouble reasoning about (1), (2), or (3); indeed, it is such effortless reasoning that leads one to recognize that the sentences are, alas (allegedly) meaningless. But this is puzzling; for one would think that such apparently successful reasoning is possible only if the given sentences are meaningful. For this reason the appearance of ad hocery is difficult to avoid; the only way of avoiding it is to provide independent reason for thinking that (1), (2), and (3) are meaningless; but this task, as is familiar, has not been an easy one.