A Model-based Form of Naturalised Metaphysics

Abstract

The paper addresses the main meta-metaphysical question, i.e., whether it is possible to do metaphysics and, in the case of an affirmative answer, how should we do it? With such an aim in mind, we sketch the broad context in which these meta-metaphysical questions arose in the philosophical literature (§ 1); then, we present what we take to be the three most widespread conceptions of metaphysics that are available in the analytic tradition: the neo-Quinean (§ 2), metaphysics as the science of possibilities (§ 3) and metaphysics as the study of the fundamental structures of reality (§ 4). We criticise these positions throughout these paragraphs before cashing out our proposal (§ 5). Our interpretation aligns with the recently proposed approach known as ‘naturalised metaphysics’ but with crucial differences. In our view, metaphysics is not only constrained by physics; rather, it grows out from all empirical sciences. More precisely, it can be achieved using formal language and the analysis of the results of scientific theories.