A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets

Abstract

Recent events in Mexico, Asia, Russia, and Brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive. Not too long ago, the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates. But this first generation view, pioneered by Krugman [1979], has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent. And, as Obstfeld [1994] has argued, currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them: witness much of Europe in the early 1990s. Obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large. This new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self-fulfilling expectations, since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained. But Obstfeld’s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession, while appropriate for the ERM 1992 crisis, was at odds with the facts in Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997. Asian