Comment on “The Role of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Sustaining Growth With Stability in India”

Abstract

Mohan (2008) presents a comprehensive review of the macroeconomic policy developments in India over the past four decades with a particular emphasis on the last two decades. India transformed from a tightly controlled socialistic economy to one of the emerging market economies with accelerating growth. Before the transformation, the Indian economy was characterized by many regulations and controls, the nationalization of banks, and fiscal deficits that were financed by the central bank. The economy was in a low growth state, and the inflation rate was high. After the transformation, fiscal deficits have been reduced, and their direct financing by the central bank is banned. Monetary policy has been geared towards achieving a low and stable inflation rate. The critical regulatory changes took place after the balance of payments crisis of 1990 ‐1991. My comments are mostly directed to the current challenges rather than to India’s historical experience. The growth acceleration from 3% in the 1960s to 1980s, to 5% in the 1990s, to 8% after 2003, as shown in Mohan’s Table 1, is impressive, but still not perfect. It is impressive because it shows steady improvement as various reforms were taking place. It does not seem perfect because, first, the growth rate did not jump to a high range, say 8 ‐10%, immediately after the critical set of reforms in the beginning of the 1990s, and, second, in the near future, the growth rate does not seem likely to climb up to the 10% level that China has been able to achieve in the last decade. Why couldn’t India achieve doubledigit growth, if China could do it? The frustration is understandable but it may be important to recall some of the other growth experiences in Asia. Japan achieved double-digit growth in the 1950s and 1960s. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore achieved near 10% growth in the 1980s and 1990s. They all relied upon manufactured exports and climbed up the ladder of sophistication as they grew. Sustained 10% growth was possible only because those countries enjoyed export booms and their export items went from low-tech to middle-tech, and eventually to high-tech goods, as they chased the country just ahead of them. This view is known as the flying geese pattern of Asian growth. In a sense, 10% gross domestic product (GDP) growth was helped by very high (much higher than 10%) growth in the exports of toys and shoes followed by motorcycles and TVs, and then petrochemicals, steel, and automobiles.