A model based on the evolutionary game theory for implementing green mining principles in riverine sand and gravel resources

Abstract

An evolutionary Game Theory (GT) model was presented to study the dynamics between the mine management and government for implementing Green Mining (GM) principles in riverine sand and gravel mines. In this regard, a game was planned in which the mine management is the executing agent, while the government acts as the supervisor. Investigating the performance of the proposed model, regulatory factors such as governmental incentives and penalties were introduced. In order to compare the results, the effects of regulatory measures on strategy changes by mine management were analyzed into two distinct scenarios: classical GT and evolutionary GT, which provide valuable insights into the complex interactions between mine management and government. The Shahed sand and gravel mine near the Kordan River in Alborz province, Iran, was selected as a case study to validate the developed GT models. The results obtained from the classical GT model showed that a fine of $ 0.2 per tonne and a 30% governmental incentive for the mining and equipment costs, may encourage the mine management to choose the GM strategy. Conversely, the results of the evolutionary GT model indicated that by increasing the government subsidy from 30% to 50%, the rate of encouraging the mine management to choose the GM strategy could be accelerated. This situation is similar to the government incentive for mine management in case of fines from $0.2 to $1 per tonne. According to the results of the evolutionary GT model, when the population ratio increases over time, the selected strategy is more compatible and powerful compared to other ones. Therefore, it is concluded that the mine management in Shahed mine may turn to the GM strategy by imposing a penalty more than $0.6 per tonne.