Abstract

This article examines the cognitive load lie detection hypothesis. The idea that lying is more challenging than telling the truth—thus, imposing cognitive load can exacerbate the challenge liars face and expose lies. I reviewed 24 publications to flag derivation chains authors employ to justify the hypothesis. The findings indicate that authors recycle the same set of justifications but not systematically. That state of the literature shields cognitive load lie detection from severe testing in two ways. There is no clear justification to focus on when wanting to nominate or design severe tests. And the justifications contain ambiguities that make it challenging to determine what would count as a severe test of the hypothesis. I illustrate those limitations and discuss the need to make cognitive load lie detection amenable to severe testing.

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