A Long Time Coming

Dieter Grimm

doi:10.1017/glj.2020.55

Abstract

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. The German court has refused to follow the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby setting “a bomb under the EU legal order.”1 Yet there is nothing new about the risk of conflict between the two courts. It came about when the Court of Justice of the European Union implicitly presumed, in 1963,2 and explicitly declared, in 1964,3 that European law takes precedence over domestic law, even over domestic constitutional law. This view was by no means without alternative, given that the Treaties of Rome do not address the precedence of Community law. The Member States involved in the dispute denied having agreed to any such precedence in the Treaties. Even the CJEU’s Advocate General was unable to find any basis in the Treaties for the precedence of European law.4 The CJEU derived the precedence of European law from the purpose of the European Economic Community.5 It argued that there could be no common market if each Member State applied and interpreted European law however it saw fit.

Highlights

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred
Unlike the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Federal Constitutional Court insists that Community law does not take precedence of its own accord but solely because the German legislator ordered its precedence of application in Germany in the Act Approving the Treaties
The CJEU reviews whether legal acts of the EU are compatible with the Treaties and such decisions are binding on the entire EU; the Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether there has been a permissible conferral of competences on the EU in relation to Germany

Summary

Introduction

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. Whether Germany has conferred competences on the EU in a legally effective manner is governed by German constitutional law and can only be determined by the Federal Constitutional Court, not by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Results

Conclusion