Abstract
The SELinux mandatory access control (MAC) policy has recently added a multilevel security (MLS) model which is able to express a fine granularity of control over a subject's access rights. The problem is that the richness of the SELinux MLS model makes it impractical to manually evaluate that a given policy meets certain specific properties. To address this issue, we have modeled the SELinux MLS model, using a logical specification and implemented that specification in the Prolog language. Furthermore, we have developed some analyses for testing information flow properties of a given policy as well as an algorithm to determine whether one policy is compliant with another. We have implemented these analyses in Prolog and compiled our implementation into a tool for SELinux MLS policy analysis, called PALMS. Using PALMS, we verified some important properties of the SELinux MLS reference policy, namely that it satisfies the simple security condition and ⋆-property defined by Bell and LaPadula. We also evaluated whether the policy associated to a given application is compliant with the policy of the SELinux system in which it would be deployed.
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