Abstract

Wireless Healthcare Sensor Network (WHSN) is a benchmarking technology deployed to levitate the quality of lives for the patients and doctors. WHSN systems must fit IEEE 802.15.6 standard for specific application criteria, unlike some standard criteria that are difficult to meet. Therefore, many security models were suggested to enhance the security of the WHSN and promote system performance. Yu and Park proposed a three-factor authentication scheme based on the smart card, biometric, and password, and their scheme can be easily employed in three-tier WHSN architecture. Furthermore, they claimed that their scheme can withstand guessing attack and provide anonymity, although, after cryptanalysis, we found that their scheme lacks both. Accordingly, we suggested a three-factor authentication scheme with better system confusion due to multiplex parametric features, hash function, and higher key size to increase the security and achieve anonymity for the connected nodes. Moreover, the scheme included initialization, authentication, re-authentication, secure node addition, user revocation, and secure data transmission via blockchain technology. The formal analysis of the scheme was conducted by BAN logic (Burrows Abadi Nadeem) and the simulation was carried out by Tamarin prover to validate that the proposed scheme is resistant to replay, session hijacking, and guessing attacks, plus it provides anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and authentication along with the key agreement.

Highlights

  • Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is widely spread through various firms such as shrewd homes, shrewd manufactory, shrewd businesses, and smart health systems such as in Wireless Healthcare Sensor Network (WHSN) [1,2,3,4,5,6,7].This technology aims to reduce the patient’s need to go to the hospital for checkups and allow the doctors to monitor the patients’ health status from a remotely far location at any time

  • The formal analysis of the scheme was conducted by BAN logic (Burrows Abadi Nadeem) and the simulation was carried out by Tamarin prover to validate that the proposed scheme is resistant to replay, session hijacking, and guessing attacks, plus it provides anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and authentication along with the key agreement

  • The adaptability of WHSN consists of small sizes, lower power, cheap sensors, and enables the communication among them to occur in a short-range [8]

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Summary

Introduction

Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is widely spread through various firms such as shrewd homes, shrewd manufactory, shrewd businesses, and smart health systems such as in WHSN [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. WHSN consists of claimed weak network smartand homes to enable the user of authenticating in aarchitecture secure manner They sensors infringe the privacy of the impersonation, patient data. After thorough analysis for the proposed schemes, we data protection that leads to node impersonation and guessing in cases where stolen smart card attack found that each has its strengths and weaknesses. Yu and Park [12] proposed three-factor authentication scheme (SLUA-WSN) for WSN acts are committed by the intruder i Their scheme can be improved regarding computation and network smart homes to enable the user of authenticating themselves in a secure manner. We propose that their scheme is protected against impersonation, stolen integrated circuit card, and guessing a robust authentication scheme based on three-factor for WHSN higher performance and capacity attacks, and provides user-anonymity with un-traceability. The scheme is appropriate for WHSN constraint system due to its efficiency in comparison to other authentication schemes

Organization
Related Works
Fuzzy Extractor
Intruder Model
Review on Yu and Park Scheme
Registration Phase of Yu and Park Scheme
Authentication Phase of Yu and Park Scheme
Cryptanalysis of Yu and Park Scheme
Proposed Protocol
Initialization Stage
Registration Phase
P-I: Authentication Phase
P-II: Re-Authentication Phase
Secure Node
Secure User Revocation
Secure Data Transmission via Blockchain
Security Analysis
Mutual Authentication
Nodes Anonymity
Brute Force Attack
Stolen Smartcard Attack
Replay Attack
Integrity
Node Impersonation
Session Hijacking Attack
6.1.10. Collision Attack
6.1.11. Scalability
6.1.13. Jamming Attack
Ban Logic Proof
Simulation with Tamarin Prover
, Figures
13. Replay
Communication Overhead
Storage Overhead
10. Comparison ofSensors scheme
Wang et al scheme
Findings
Conclusions and secure one
Full Text
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