Abstract

Blockchain is a transformational technology which affects finance, Internet, and politics. However, many privacy protection problems for blockchain are waiting to be solved. In this study, we propose a novel linkable ring signature scheme with stealth addresses, which enables the payer and payee of the transaction to be anonymous and unlinkable in the cryptocurrency. The scheme is combined with an elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECD logarithm)-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) stage and a lattice-based signature stage. The master public key and master secret key are much smaller compared with the previous scheme. Complete secure proof of the scheme is also presented in this study.

Highlights

  • In [9], the authors proposed a linkable ring signature scheme with stealth addresses denoted by SALRS. is scheme enables the payer and payee of the transaction to be anonymous and unlinkable in the cryptocurrency

  • When it comes to the linkability which can prevent double spending in a transaction, if two signatures are generated by the payee B corresponding to a derived public key, they will be detected as linked because the coin corresponding to the derived public key can be used only once

  • We propose a novel concrete linkable ring signature scheme with stealth addresses based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECD logarithm) for the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) stage and lattice for signature stage. e ECD-based KEM provides smaller keys

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Summary

Introduction

In [9], the authors proposed a linkable ring signature scheme with stealth addresses denoted by SALRS. We propose a novel concrete linkable ring signature scheme with stealth addresses based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECD logarithm) for the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) stage and lattice for signature stage. E existing works on the linkable ring signature and stealth address have been proposed, e.g., [8, 22]. E new cryptographic primitive has combined the linkable ring signature with the stealth address and captured adversarially chosen key attacks in the linkability model.

Preliminaries
Security Model of SALRS
Our Concrete Scheme of SALRS
Concrete SALRS Construction
Security Analysis of Our SALRS Construction
Query 1
Efficiency Analysis
Conclusion
Full Text
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