A Granular Theory of Balancing

Abstract

Theories of balancing are under assault. On theoretical and historical grounds, realists and non-realists challenge the claim that states balance against shifts in aggregate material capabilities. In addressing these claims, this article presents a more granular and finely tuned theory of balancing. It contends that states do, in fact, balance effectively. While foreign policy leaders regularly ignore aggregate power developments, they do disaggregate power to identify threatening states and target their balancing against specific threatening elements. Targeted-balancing theory explains why some historical cases coded as under-balancing are really instances of appropriate balancing; why a more powerful state's military buildup, or alliance formation against a weaker state, can constitute balancing; and why some instances of non- or missing-balancing against a more powerful state do not undermine balance-of-power theory. I provide support for my claims through an analysis of Britain's balancing against Germany and Italy between 1936 and 1939. Rather than under-balancing, or failing to balance altogether, London target-balanced against the specific threatening elements of German and Italian power. Given that power is rarely fungible across elements, London ranked other components of their power as secondary, and even last, in terms of Britain's rearmament priorities.