Abstract
In this paper I argue that J. G. Fichte’s Wissenschaftlehre 1811 offers a sound model for explaining the conditions of semantics. The paper begins following the suggestion of Wolfram Hogrebe who introduced the concept of archaeological semantic postulate to define the implicit condition for a sentence to be meaningful. I maintain that in Fichte’s definition of the phenomenon of being we can find such a semantic postulate at a genetic higher level than the principle of contradiction indicated by Hogrebe. Moreover the WL 1811 offers an analysis of the steps through which the phenomenon displays itself – the ability, the as such, the ought to – that we can understand as the closest conditions for establishing a meaningful sentence.
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